Skip to main content

Privacy & Redaction

The invariant​

Raw prompt content, source code, file contents, sensitive paths, shell/tool arguments, secrets, and private API responses default to local-only (ADR 0001, D7). The local critical path — evidence capture, verification, status line, detail command, dashboard — works entirely with cloud network access disabled. Cloud sync is strictly async, best-effort, and only after policy explicitly approves it.

Cloud sync defaults to off​

pub fn cloud_sync_allowed() -> bool {
    std::env::var("FORNAX_CLOUD_SYNC_ENABLED")
        .map(|v| v == "1" || v.eq_ignore_ascii_case("true"))
        .unwrap_or(false)
}

Unset, or set to anything other than 1/true (case-insensitive) — including other truthy-looking strings like yes — leaves sync disabled. A cloud uploader now exists (in the separate fornax-cloud service, as an opt-in Beta preview, not GA) and must consult this gate before any network call, so a user can disable sync mid-session and have it take effect immediately. Device registration is self-service (FORNX-137) — see Quick Start.

Redaction at the ingest boundary​

Before any evidence payload is persisted, Fornax scans it for recognizable secret shapes and redacts them — a conservative, pattern-based classifier, not a guarantee. Applied once, at the boundary, not re-derived per downstream consumer:

  • GitHub tokens (ghp_, gho_, ghu_, ghs_ prefixes).
  • Env-style secret assignments — a line containing TOKEN=/API_KEY=/APIKEY=/SECRET=/PASSWORD=/PRIVATE_KEY= (case-insensitive) is redacted in full, since the value sits on the same line as its name.
  • Generic high-entropy tokens — a 20–200 character unbroken alphanumeric-ish run (letters, digits, _-./+=) with both letters and digits and no whitespace — the shape of an API key, not natural-language text.
input:  GITHUB_TOKEN=ghp_1234567890abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz
output: [REDACTED: possible secret assignment]

input:  7 failed, 1 passed in 3.21s
output: 7 failed, 1 passed in 3.21s        (untouched — not secret-shaped)

Redaction is deliberately biased toward false positives: redacting something benign is far cheaper than missing a real secret. It applies recursively through JSON payloads — only string values are scanned, field names are left alone (a key isn't a secret).

What "redacted" does not mean​

Redacted is not the same as "safe to sync." Redaction removes recognizable secret shapes from what gets stored; whether anything leaves the machine at all is a separate, independent gate (cloud_sync_allowed() above). Both checks exist, and neither substitutes for the other.

Testing this claim, not just asserting it​

The local critical path's independence from cloud availability is tested explicitly with cloud config disabled — this isn't just written down in an ADR, it's a real test condition Fornax's own CI runs against (FORNX-34).

Redaction at the ingest boundary — the point where evidence first reaches the local daemon, before it is stored or spooled for upload — is covered by an automated regression test and has been independently re-verified with a live canary marker. What has not had the same depth of independent, end-to-end re-verification is the further path an uploaded envelope takes once it leaves that boundary: transport through fornax-cloud's uploader, ingest, and backend, into the hosted dashboard. That downstream path relies on the uploader's own last-line-of-defense egress guard rather than a second full pipeline re-check. This isn't rounded up to "fully verified" — it's a real, disclosed gap, not a hidden one.